Abstract. This paper aims to capture and systematise those practices which have been proven as good skills, tactics, methods, and techniques at effectively and efficiently delivering particular outcomes behind brand integration in various mergers and acquisitions (M&As). These practices can be shared and learned to increase the probability of brand integration success in future M&As. The paper adopts the case-study method by interviewing several top-level executives, M&A managers, functional managers and members of M&A projects which have been involved in M&As. Twenty practices are outlined and defined after analysing ten M&A events within six case companies (which are multinational corporations – MNCs). The paper provides managers with insights into good (or winning) practices that MNCs have adopted in integrating brands in their M&As by addressing a number of specific issues and corresponding solutions. The twenty practices for the integration of brands in M&As are classified into eight major clusters according to the dimensions of brand and brand management these practices are related to – brand strategic positioning, brand people, brand knowledge transfer, brand integration planning, brand integration implementation, brand disposal expertise, brand disposal negotiation, and brand due diligence. These clusters allow M&A and integration managers to accumulate their own brand integration practices from time to time systematically. These also help facilitate the adoption of a learning approach by firms to their later M&As.

Keywords: brand, M&As, brand integration, practices, MNCs.

BRAND INTEGRATION PRACTICES IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

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1. Introduction

1.1. Research background

Although mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are considered a common way of generating corporate growth and value, most of the M&As don’t generate shareholder value growth (Brewis, 2000; Habeck et al., 2000; Kearney, 1998; KPMG, 1999; PR Newswire, 1999; BusinessWeek, 2002). A number of researchers constantly indicate that more than 80% of corporate combinations do not achieve their desired financial or strategic objectives (Davidson, 1991; Elsass and Veiga, 1994; Lubatkin, 1983; Carleton, 1997). Even though post-M&A integration is considered extremely important for success (Child et al., 2001; Kearney, 1988; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Simpson, 2000; Appelbaum et al., 2000), more research in this domain is needed (Shimizu et al., 2004). In many of the M&As brands play central roles in companies’ growth and value creation (Vu et al., 2009). Brands are not only major objectives in their own right in M&As but also the starting point for solving problems of overlapping resources in order to realise synergy (ibid). Simultaneously managing several brands or restructuring the brand portfolio by eliminating brands and/or bringing in other ones involves critical decisions (Dabija, 2010). According to Vester (2002), following best practices and a disciplined integration program, an acquisition can be successful, despite the proven fact that the majority of acquisitions don’t add value to the acquirer. The good practices of organisations who have been involved in M&As can provide useful knowledge about integration skills, tactics, methods and techniques which can help other companies improve their own chances of successful future brand integration when involved in a M&A.

The merger between Guinness plc and Grand Metropolitan plc proves the essential role of brand integration practices for the success of M&As. This merger, announced in December 1997, formed Diageo plc - the world’s largest producer of alcoholic drinks. In our interview a senior executive of Diageo revealed that the compelling proposition was an astonishing brand portfolio created when the two companies merged. The integration was about growth. Every brand strategy Diageo employed in integrating the two spirits portfolios aimed to deliver this growth. One of the big issues that challenged the success of brand integration and the building of a world-class brand position was that initially both Guinness and Grand Met had their own brand building and marketing processes which were quite different to each other. Therefore, the newly formed Diageo organisation had no commonality and consistency of approach, with different sets of brand building and marketing processes underpinning individual brands. To solve this problem Diageo developed ‘Diageo’s Way of Brand Building’ (DWBB), a tool which pulled together the best marketing and brand building management practices of the two firms. Mr. Rob Malcolm, Diageo's President of Global Marketing, Sales and Innovation, highlighted the importance of developing this common approach (DWBB), as well as its costs and payback: “We estimate the corporate commitment to DWBB in investment terms over the past four
years to be in the order of £35m. That includes the cost of the days invested as well as all the programme and training costs. That is a very big commitment, but once we feel that has an almost immediate payback. As a percentage of the total investment in marketing, advertising and promotion, that number is actually less than one half of 1% of that asset. If we increase the efficiency of efficacy of our marketing programme by only 5% per year, the payback is virtually instantaneous” (The Coverdale Organisation Ltd). In this example Diageo employed its own method (i.e. DWBB) to ensure the success of the brand integration in the post-merger. Depicting such cases provides ‘good practices’ that provide higher success chances to brand integration in future M&As.

1.2. Literature review on M&A and integration practices

The existing literature emphasizes several practices that take place during each phase of the M & A process. On the one hand, some of the studies included in the M&A and integration practices literature focus on a specific practice as the key-issue for the success of M & As:

- **Communication** – plays a critical role to M&A success (Dooley and Zimmerman, 2003; Lazaridis, 2003). Feldman and Murata (1991) insist on the importance of good communication of the M&A outcomes, Lambkin and Muzellec (2010) on communication to stakeholders - employees, customers and financial community (the integration process being more probably to be successful if there is a perceived benefit from the infusion of value from the new owner), while Schweiger and DeNisi (1991) on communication with employees. Regarding the latter case, Appelbaum et al. (2000) emphasize the fact that communication is a key-issue as it influences the employees’ ability to adopt a new culture, sustain the change process and deal with stress.

- **Leadership**. Covin et al. (1997) view leadership as critical for successful integration in M&As, having in such contexts a “transformational” role (Brătianu and Anagnoste, 2011). Thach and Nyman (2001) insist on the importance of leadership on effectively managing and motivating employees during M&A.

- **Building commitment and trust** – is essential to M&A success for Korsgaard et al. (1995).

- **Motivating and retaining key people**. Kummer (2008) views this practice as the key-issue in M&As. Moreover, Bert et al. (2003) outline the fact that good communication enhances the success of M&As by retaining capable staff and enhancing staff’s commitment which are critical to future company growth and success of M&As.

- **Planning and quick implementation**. Domis (1999) considers that quick integration is essential to M&A success. Pritchett et al. (1997) perceive quick integration as being critical in order to achieve early wins in M&A, while maintaining closer-than-usual contact is very important afterwards. Galpin and Herndon (2000) argue that actions to boost sales and service must be overtly planned and quickly
executed in M&As, while Gadiesh et al. (2003) emphasize that speed and careful planning are essential to successful M&A integration (also suggesting that integration managers need to know how to make trade-offs between these two rules).

On the other hand, most of the literature concerning M&A practices includes studies which do not try to emphasize a single-specific practice as key-issue, but rather outline sets of practices (Table 1), all of these having a great deal of importance to the M&A success.

**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research</th>
<th>M&amp;A and Integration Practices (in italics)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marks (1997)</td>
<td>Effective communications; Persuading employees on the business and personal benefits of the combination; Showing empathy and demonstrating respect for people and their situation; Hands-on and top-level leadership (e.g. dedicating executive time and focus; putting together a leadership team; focusing management on success factors; creating a sense of human purpose and direction; modelling desired behaviours and rules of the road).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Thinking (1998)</td>
<td>Plan assiduously prior to acquisition; Act swiftly to implement plans; Be frank and open about informing all employees; Act correctly and sensitively during the acquisition process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bijlsma-Frankema (2001)</td>
<td>Sharing and exchange, shared norm, shared goals, monitoring and common inquiry, a clear sense of where to go, clarification of goals and expectation, giving feedback on success or failure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nguyen and Kleiner (2003)</td>
<td>Directors must get out of the boardroom; Set direction for the new business; Understand the emotional political and rational issues; Maximise involvement; Focus on communication; Provide clarity around roles and decision lines; Continue to focus on customers; and be flexible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schraeder and Self (2003)</td>
<td>Developing a flexible and comprehensive integration plan; Sharing information and encouraging communication; Encouraging participation by involving others in the process; Enhancing commitment by establishing relationships and building trust; Managing acculturation through training; Support and socialisation; Respecting individual and temporal aspects of the integration process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Camara and Renjen (2004)</td>
<td>Early and detailed planning; Forming a joint-integration team who share confidential information about the two firms; Direct senior management involvement; Serving customers despite a merger; Communicating the vision; Getting a handle on culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang and Kleiner (2004)</td>
<td>Communication; Leadership; Focus on Customers; Paying attention to the hidden meanings in communication; Quick integration; Post audit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lundback and Horte (2005)</td>
<td>Differences between organizational structures must be harmonised and taken into consideration; Culture plays a large part in the success of any M&amp;A; The communication during the integration must be continuous and intense; Responsibilities must be clearly defined from the outset; The balance between strategic interdependence and process change must be worked out as early as possible (not all aspects of the acquirer’s organisation need to be imposed on the acquired company).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messmer (2006)</td>
<td>Early communication (timely, honest and direct information, together with a realistic assessment of future opportunities and obstacles, such as</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Brand Integration Practices in Mergers and Acquisitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research</th>
<th>M&amp;A and Integration Practices <em>(in italics)</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firstbrook (2007)</td>
<td>Start with a clear and compelling strategy; Understand the markets and their environments; Convey respect for employees of acquired company; Execution, execution, execution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papadakis (2007)</td>
<td>Establish leadership quickly; Involve middle managers; Seek growth opportunities; Communicate internally; Create early wins; Manage cultural integration; Serve all customers without disruption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galpin (2008)</td>
<td>Planning early; Always communicating and sharing information; Quick integration; Measuring and tracking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharp (2009)</td>
<td>Technology – integrating and converting technologies can be costly, and compatibility of technologies is a key to the success of a M&amp;A integration process; therefore, independent experts are often recommended to assess both complexity and cost of technology integration. Culture – combining two companies with rich history is a complex and risky process; integrating their philosophies, communication styles, training cultures, performance management styles etc. involves active and continuous communication with employees of both acquiree and acquirer before and after the M&amp;A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland and Salama (2010)</td>
<td>Creating an “integration team”; Assessing corporate cultures, learning through cultural differences; Sharing new vision through communication and involvement (training and development play an important role); Redesigning organizational structure; Revising human resources philosophy and practices (new criteria for recruitment/selection, new training and development programs, new reward/appraisal systems etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee et al. (2011)</td>
<td>The authors demonstrate that if the brand image of the acquiree is significantly better than that of the acquirer, the equity of the acquired brand could significantly decrease. In such cases: the management team of the acquired brand should not be replaced so that consumers keep assuming the quality of the product is still the same; the link between the acquiring and acquired brands should be decreased; communications with consumers via advertisements should continue in order to assure consumers that the quality of the product is still the same.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Authors’ own research

Fundamentally, all practices can be grouped in some common ones such as: communication, leadership, motivating and retaining key people, building commitment and trust, forming a joint team from the two parties, conveying respect for the employees of the acquired company, managing acculturation, sharing goals, vision and norms, careful planning, speed, measuring and tracking. However, most of these are more related to human and cultural aspects of M&As and M&A integration phase and valuable in helping employees manage M&A-related stress, crisis of combination, and culture clash and post-merger culture building. They are also quite generic and apply mostly to the overall implementation of M&As and, therefore, not specifically to the integration of brands in M&As.

Although some research addressed the focus on continuously serving customers to boost sales and services (Galpin and Herndon, 2000; Nguyen and Kleiner, 2003; de Camara and Renjen, 2004; Papadakis, 2007) which are related to
product and brand, or on the link between the acquiring and acquired brands (Lee et al., 2011), these practices are neither enough nor systematic for the integration of brands in post-M&As.

2. Research aims and method

The term ‘best practices’ is usually taken to mean the simplest available method that delivers the quickest and most desirable result (Taylor, 1911), the one-and-only best way (Kanigel, 1997), or, as Industry Week sees it, a collection of stories from America’s and Europe’s best plants to be shared and learned in order to improve competitiveness and productivity (Panchak, 2000). Therefore, the term ‘best practices’ is normally understood narrower than (or as a part of) the term ‘good practices’. This research aims to capture and systematise ‘good practices’ which could help firms to benchmark and learn in order to improve the success of brand integration in future M&As. In this paper ‘good practices’ are defined as good skills, tactics, methods, and techniques which are effective and efficient at delivering particular outcomes behind the integration of brands in various M&As. The case-study method (Yin, 1994) was used to capture these insights (i.e. good practices) because these could not be done through quantitative method. Top-level executives, M&A managers, functional managers and members of M&A projects who were involved in ten M&A events within six case MNCs were interviewed (Table 2). These case firms were selected because brands were the focus of their integration in the post-M&As. The size of these M&As also varied – small, medium, large, and mega in order to allow generalizability of the findings.

In what regards the definition of a brand, AMA (1960) states that a brand represents a “name, term, sign, symbol, or design, or a combination of them intended to identify the goods and services of one seller or group of sellers and to differentiate them from those of competition”. Although AMA’s definition had been the most frequently quoted for almost two decades, during the 1970s, several authors began suggesting that brands encompass more than identifying visual symbols created by brand owners, reflecting consumers’ perceptions of its identification marks (King, 1970; Cooper, 1979). Some authors (de Chernatony and McDonald, 1992) identified at least twelve different brand definitions in use at the beginning of the 1990s, each assigning different roles and functions to brands. Moreover, de Chernatony and Riley (1998) showed that although several common definition elements were embraced, no common brand definition could be identified as being shared among brand experts.

In order to operationalize this research, a pragmatic and common sense approach has been adopted regarding the issue of defining the term ‘brand’, due to the fact that respondents involved in the case studies did not share a common definition when talking about brands. Still, all respondents seemed to embrace some common views such as the complexity of brands as entities, and their mixed nature – both brand owner and brand user components, on the one hand, and both functional/rational and emotional elements, on the other hand – even though they didn’t seem to agree on the
relative importance of each (for example, Diageo and SABMiller both placed greater emphasis upon the emotional aspects of their brands, while Sealed Air Cryovac tended to see the functional elements as the more important ones, this difference suggesting that as the technology used by a company is more complex, the functional facet of its brands is more emphasized). However, each case study company was permitted to approach the term ‘brand’ in its own terms, while the degree to which they placed more or less weight on the functional/emotional brand component was considered the main determinant of inter-company variation.

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>M&amp;A Firms</th>
<th>Name of the post-M&amp;A organisation</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Deal Value (Billion)</th>
<th>Nationalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Guinness – Grand Metropolitan</td>
<td>Diageo</td>
<td>Spirits</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>£24.0</td>
<td>UK-UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Diageo – Seagram</td>
<td>Diageo</td>
<td>Spirits</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$8.2</td>
<td>UK-France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Glaxo Wellcome – SmithKline Beecham</td>
<td>GSK</td>
<td>Pharma</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>£130.0</td>
<td>UK-UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a</td>
<td>Ford – Jaguar</td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>Automobile</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>£2.6</td>
<td>USA-UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b</td>
<td>Ford – Volvo</td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>Automobile</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$6.45</td>
<td>USA-Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3c</td>
<td>Ford – Land Rover</td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>Automobile</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>£1.8</td>
<td>USA-UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sealed Air Cryovac – Soten</td>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Packaging</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$12.0</td>
<td>USA-Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a</td>
<td>SAB – Miller</td>
<td>SABMiller</td>
<td>Beer</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>South Africa - USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b</td>
<td>SABMiller – Grupo Emporial Bavaria (GEB)</td>
<td>SABMiller</td>
<td>Beer</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$7.8</td>
<td>UK – Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Cadbury Schweppes – Adams</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Confectionery</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$4.2</td>
<td>UK-USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Authors’ own research

A four-step approach given by Lamb (1998) was adopted for conducting case studies: familiarisation, initial assessment, detailed assessment, and feedback. Of these, the ‘initial assessment’ step recommends to set up an initial meeting with each case firm to have a brief overview about them. However, the real difficulty is that interviews are regarded as taking too much time of senior management. Therefore, the researcher has to tailor this step by introducing the research to the interviewee(s), requesting meeting(s), and getting background information through telephoning or emailing rather than through exploratory meetings.

An introductory letter and project briefing that describe the benefits of project participation was sent to the interviewees by either email or mail. Potential interviewees were then contacted by telephone or email to arrange a face-to-face meeting for further discussion. The format of each meeting included an introduction to the research, main interview discussion, wrapping up and request for further discussions. As soon as any interviewee agreed to a meeting, a semi-structured questionnaire was sent to the interviewee in advance for preparation.
### Details of the procedure for conducting case studies for the research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Detailed Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Familiarisation</td>
<td>Background analysis of case companies through database, industry reports, Internet, or annual report and initial contact by letter and telephone, fax or email.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial assessment</td>
<td>Introduction of the research to the interviewee(s), requesting for meetings while gaining a brief overview about each case firm through emailing or telephoning rather than through an exploratory meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed assessment</td>
<td>A series of interviews will be taken with various members of case firms: In-depth information for brand integration will be gathered and collected from different views. In the context of M&amp;As, interviews will be taken with marketing, operations, technology and new product development, and strategic planning people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feedback</td>
<td>Circulation of draft report of the cases and the workshop (if any) with the case firms' members.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Adapted from Lamb (1998)

A series of interviews was conducted with various members of each case firm depending on the level of access. Those members were from relevant functions and departments i.e., chairman, presidents, marketing and sales, operations, technology and new product development, and strategy. Further interviews were conducted by means of introductions set up by the first interviewee or by direct contact, a process known as ‘snowballing’.

Semi-structured questionnaires, timelines, tables and diagrams were used during each interview. The results from previous interviews were referred to, as necessary, in later interviews. Basically, the questionnaire and the interviews aimed to explore the key elements of the conceptual framework in depth and any potential issues that the interviewer had not foreseen. The checklist of items brought to each interview included:

- *A package of documents related to the research*: the introductory letter, the project brochure, the refined historical stories of the M&As related to the case company, the conceptual framework, and interviewer’s business cards.
- *A 5-minute-PowerPoint presentation of the research*: basically, the presentation covered the contents in the research brochure.
- *The refined questionnaire*: revised based upon feedback from the interviewee before the meeting or from the previous meeting(s).

Each interview was recorded in full except where this was not allowed by the interviewees (i.e. confidential information). Notes were always taken by the researcher as a backup. In addition as a supporting method in collecting the data, visual data such as diagrams or graphs were used by the interviewee(s) where the recorder could not capture an important point. The content of each interview was transcribed immediately after the interview. This helped the researcher to analyse the data from the case firms immediately and to pose further questions to the interviewees in case of need.

This research follows the framework for conducting case studies given by Yin (1994) by examining both individual and cross-case analyses. The individual case
analysis was conducted based upon the aims and objectives set by this research. As pointed out by Miles and Huberman (1994), individual case analysis includes exploring, describing, explaining and predicting the data. Therefore, the single case analysis of this research consists of displaying data, explaining and initially generalising, and reviewing the conceptual strategies and framework. Basically, each individual case consists of the following:

- **Overall introduction to the M&A**: this explores, describes and explains general information about merging firms.
- **Brand integration**: this explores, describes and explains the details of the brand integration process and some good practices employed by the merging firms.
- **Within-case analysis**: a research objective was to capture some best practices for brand integration from various industries.

The cross-case analysis is based on a summary of the findings drawn (or extracted) from the *Within-Case Analysis* of the individual case studies. The cross-case analysis includes description and recommendations of some good practices employed by the merging firms in different industries.

### 3. Research findings

According to Vu et al. (2009) firms may not only combine but also divest themselves of some of the merging brands in the post M&A integration process (especially in horizontal M&As that take place when two companies in the same industry with competing products and brands combine – Stacey (1966)). Twenty good practices – as the findings of this research – fit into these two directions and, therefore, are divided into two distinct groups – the **mixing** of merging brands and the **divestment** of merging brands.

#### 3.1. Mixing merging brands

Given the fact that each brand targets a specific market segment and has a unique identity, brand integration should be harmonised with the post-M&A brands strategic direction, and it should confer the best growth opportunities for the merging brands.

**3.1.1. Identifying a strategic position for the merging brands**

Chailan (2008) identifies three important phases of brand portfolio management during M&A brand integration processes: accumulation, reformation and grouping. The first phase addresses consumers’ requirements. In this phase the firm tries their best in possible way to respond to all customers’ needs and expectations. The second phase (as a result of a great pressure from different groups of stakeholders) aims to limit the number of brands and/or to position them in a way to avoid scattering resources and to concentrate marketing efforts (the brands are no
longer perceived as individual responses to consumer requirements, but rather as parts of a whole. The third phase deals with the creation of groups of brands that will become a permanent source of sustainable competitive advantage. In line with these, there are two key issues to be effectively addressed by the post-M&A organisation: the resource allocation for the mixed brand portfolio, and, respectively, the management and communication system for each brand. Identifying strategic position for the merging brands is essential in this case and implies strategically taking into consideration both local and international markets.

In Cases 1a and 1b the post-merger Diageo classified its merging brands into 3 classes within each category: global priority brands with global market and global positioning (e.g. ‘Johnnie Walker’, ‘J&B’), local priority brand market units which are very strong in a particular country in terms of consumer preference, high sales and profitability (e.g. ‘Windsor’ in Korea and ‘Buchanan’s’ in Mexico), and category brands which target niche segments with growth prospects and profitability in several countries (e.g. ‘Haig’ in Greece and India and ‘Black & White’ in a few countries). This categorisation is very useful for Diageo in building a portfolio that covers most of the consumer needs in terms of price point, consumer occasions, and motivations. It also helps Diageo allocate the resources and manage around the competitors efficiently and effectively.

In Case 2 the post-merger GSK prioritised their resources and efforts according to three levels of healthcare brand classification – global brand (marketed in multiple markets), lead market brands (marketed in a few markets), and enterprise brands (valuable local brands). This classification enabled GSK to enhance the growth for each brand and achieve the best performance through effective coordination among R&D, marketing and commercial operating functions.

In Cases 5a and 5b SABMiller named and built ‘Pilsner Urquell’, ‘Peroni Nastro Azzurro’, and ‘Miller Draught Genuine’ as its international premium brands after acquiring them from local breweries in the Czech, Italian and US markets respectively. This helped maximise the growth of these brands in international markets.

3.1.2. Balancing between consistency and flexibility

The post-M&A organisation needs to leverage effective and efficient management of merging brands, particularly those that have an international position. The management and building of each brand in the combined portfolio needs to be consistent around the world and needs to match its identified role, the resulting brand identity and value being similar in every market. Still, since consumer behaviour may vary from market to market, the strategic position established for each brand in the mixed portfolio only offers general guidance, as no single model is applicable everywhere. Therefore, there is a need for flexibility in implementing the brand strategic model.
In Cases 1a and 1b Diageo applied its strategic brand positioning model globally, but allowed some flexibility on a country by country basis. Diageo did not in fact apply the global priority brands model to each country because of the wide variation in brand standings across these markets. For instance, ‘Johnnie Walker’ is a brand leader in many large markets around the world but not in the UK (where the brand was withdrawn in 70s/80s because of internal European competition and pricing problems). Therefore, ‘Johnnie Walker’ is low priority for the UK whereas the ‘Bell’s’ brand is a big player. The global positioning and size of the brand would drive decisions about ‘Johnnie Walker’, but local strategies would drive decisions about Bell’s or other local priority brands that are only strong in a few local markets such as Spain, Portugal, France, Korea, or Mexico. Focusing on ‘Johnnie Walker’ in the UK would produce little sales growth for Diageo as a whole.

In Cases 5a and 5b, SABMiller has a so-called ‘brand mutual perspective’ when acquiring a local brewery; which means they tend not to impose their international brands on local managers, believing instead that the local acquired portfolio should provide the major contribution to the value creation in the acquired business. Hence SABMiller gives the local team the opportunity to build and develop the local brand portfolio first before bringing in their international brands. As an example, when entering the premium segment gap in the Latin American market, SABMiller’s local management team decided to use ‘Club Colombia’, an existing brand of GEB, as their premium brand. However, for some other local markets such as the US and some European countries, SABMiller deployed its two international brands ‘Pilsner Urquell’ and ‘Peroni’ in the premium position. SABMiller recognises that insisting on building the international brands would be counterproductive in some markets.

3.1.3. Organising human resources

The effectiveness of the merging brands strategic model implementation depends on how effectively the human resources are organised.

Ford established a “Premier Automotive Group” (PAG) to be in charge of its premium brands right after the acquisition of Jaguar. Furthermore, when the company acquired Land Rover and Volvo (also premium brands), the PAG took the responsibility of brand integration (Cases 3a, 3b and 3c).

In Cases 1a and 1b, in order to facilitate brand management and streamline the assignment of the integration task Diageo split its global teams into:

- a Release Group in America, that was put in charge of the brands in the ‘release’ area of the consumer need segmentation (people go out for party): e.g. ‘Smirnoff’ (Vodka) and ‘Cuervo’ (Tequila).
- a Guinness Group in Dublin, that was in charge of Guinness beer.
- a Whisky, Gin and Reserve Brand (WGRB) Group based in Amsterdam in the Netherlands: these are all based on ‘status’ (drinking to show status) and
Management & Marketing

‘discernment’ (drinking ‘the best brand’, the brand as an element of ‘good living’) categories and include ‘Johnnie Walker’, ‘J&B’, and ‘Tanqueray’.

- a Baileys Group which was responsible for the ‘contentment’ core consumer need (people drink to relax).

When acquiring a new brand Diageo immediately knows which team is in charge of integrating and managing that brand and how the new brand should be positioned in comparison with other brands. For example, when ‘Captain Morgan’ brand was acquired, Diageo positioned it in the ‘release’ core consumer need. Therefore, ‘Captain Morgan’ was put under the management of the Release Group. Generally speaking the global brand teams take care of the global priority brands while local teams are in charge of the local priority brand units. The global brand teams are in charge of global marketing and innovation and concerned with the growth and development of the global brands.

3.1.4. Being equal and treating people with respect and fair financial benefits

Given the fact that M&As often take place at corporate level, the issues regarding ‘people’ (including the necessary laying offs) are the first to be addressed right after the announcement of the deal. These issues are frequently addressed by getting ‘the right people’ and assigning them the responsibility of identifying the best solutions for the business. The integration of human resources becomes an essential issue, one common response from the managers in the case studies being that groups of people embedded within particular cultures are difficult to integrate. In relation to brand integration, three important rules could be outlined from the case studies: the best brand people must be selected equally from both sides (with focus on wanted talents and without trying to impose one culture on the other), people must be integrated rapidly and with sensitively, and, respectively, respect and fair financial benefits must be ensured to all.

In Case 1a the first thing Diageo did was senior management appointment: ‘We started with an executive committee where around 12 people were appointed from the previous total of about 20 in the combined Guinness’ UD and Grand Met’s IDV spirits businesses’ (a Vice President of Diageo); or ‘I was marketing director at the IDV of Grand Met. Both I and the marketing director at the UD of Guinness were considered equally for the job. Our goal was to keep the best people, not to impose one culture on another’ (The Global Innovation Director at Diageo). Once Diageo had the executive committee in place, they were able to interview managers in charge of each country and make appointments.

Similarly, people integration was the first thing GSK did (Case 2). The deal was an equal merger with the best of both combined. An executive board of 16 people was appointed from the 25 in the combined boards of the two firms. The number of members from each side was equal. GSK also formed an integration planning committee drawn equally from the top management boards of both GW and SB.
Treating people with respect involves not only fair financial benefits, but also communicating with them. People need to be informed as soon as possible about expected changes, about their company’s future and their future in the company, this kind of information being very helpful in the process of retaining the best people. According to the Global Innovation Director (Case 1a), if Diageo is going to make a decision that is related to human resources in the next few months, Diageo lets people know immediately because it is very important for people to be kept informed. Another good practice Diageo adopted in regard to treating people with respect is to have the person who is not appointed helping the person who is appointed for the integration.

In the pharmaceutical industry GSK also seemed to employ similar practices together with appropriate financial benefit and communication (Case 2). The integration planning committee consisted of both appointed and ‘retired’ people: e.g. Sir Richard Sykes of Glaxo Wellcome, who agreed to step down as the CEO to clear the way for the merger was the co-chair in the integration planning committee. Several other ex-members of the executive boards of GW and SB were also a part of the integration planning committee.

3.1.5. Providing training to brand people

Brands are managed by people. A brand acquisition comes along with its brand people, its marketing, its brand building methods, its brand ‘languages’ or terminologies and others. An essential part of brand integration consists in homogenizing all of the above – making people do brand building in a common way and speak a similar marketing or brand ‘language’ – a process in which training can be an extremely useful tool.

Diageo (Case 1b) owns ‘Diageo’s way of brand building’ (DWBB), a complete way of doing marketing which consists of tools, processes and practices for brand building. When Diageo buys a brand with associated marketing and brand people, they are immediately sent on the DWBB training course which is a two-week training programme to get people to understand and speak in DWBB. Diageo insists on all marketing and brand staff using the same language and the same techniques around the world.

In Cases 3a, 3b, and 3c people at Ford, Jaguar, Land Rover and Volvo designed cars in different ways. Ford’s resources had evolved independently over time and the result was Ford could not build, for example, a Land Rover in a Volvo factory because they work in different ways. Apart from integrating all the tools and processes together, Ford has been trying to train people in order to get them to work on common or sequential process structures and tools (e.g. the same product architecture) for new product development and other aspects of manufacturing. Up until 2008 aspects of the way Ford has designed cars may vary significantly between one car family-type and another, and between one brand and another.
3.1.6. Empowering brand people

M&As especially the horizontal ones usually result in the acquiring firms gaining new resources and capabilities (technologies, processes, brand supporting systems etc.) for which effective people management is critical, particularly in what leadership skills and the ability to motivate people are concerned. The role of people empowerment in brand integration is both to give authority and to increase people’s confidence in their own expertise (thus enhancing their contribution to the overall brand integration success).

Ford’s growth by M&As gained them a number of product development centres (or so-called ‘centre of excellence’ CoEs), but none of them took on a central role (Cases 3a, 3b, 3c). Consequently, product and engineering design was different from one centre to another although they might have been working on the same type of car. However, Ford could not shut down some of its CoEs, retaining only one or two major ones, because people would go, making Ford lose the strengths, capabilities, expertise and uniqueness of each brand.

Ford retained different CoEs but employed a virtual-centralised approach for product development by assigning different technology areas to different brands. Each centre would take a lead in their own area of strength: Volvo for safety and premium; Ford Europe for efficiency, good powertrain, and good driving dynamics; Jaguar for premium, emotional experience, driving dynamics; and Land Rover for off-road or 4-wheel drive capability. These solutions would be shared among the different CoEs. One of the benefits of this was that different brands ‘felt’ that they were particularly important in a particular area and their leadership roles would get more integrated because each brand shared their expertise across other brands. Therefore, empowering people helped the integration process at Ford, particularly the integration of technology.

3.1.7. Learning from acquired brands

Instead of assuming the adequacy of its existing brand management and market knowledge, the post-M&A organisation needs to conduct new market research in order to identify opportunities for the newly acquired brands and, moreover, to assimilate and use the brand and market knowledge possessed by the acquired company.

In Case 1b, Diageo tried not to assume that they had better knowledge of the Seagram brands simply because they were bigger and were the acquiring firm. When integrating the ‘Captain Morgan’ brand, Diageo revisited its consumer research on the brand to establish the best need segment for the brand. In addition they called upon the heritage and knowledge of ‘Captain Morgan’ as critical input when establishing the current brand identity in the consumers’ mind.

In Case 1a the senior executive at Diageo revealed that brand strategy had been much more a centrally managed activity in the IDV division (Grand Met) than it
Brand integration practices in mergers and acquisitions

had been in the UD division (Guinness). Diageo ended up with a central governance on brand positioning and advertising, but with most of the marketplace authority and capability given to local market and regional teams.

3.1.8. Codifying and transferring brand management and integration practices

International issues (Child et al., 2001) and learning processes (Very and Schweiger, 2001) are frequently involved in M&As. A transfer of brand management or integration knowledge, skills and best practices usually takes place between the acquirer and the acquired. When a firm has been involved in one M&A, it can use the learned knowledge and practices to promote successful integration. Codifying, transferring and making such knowledge available should enhance the success of brand integration (like Diageo in the exploratory case), being sometimes more effective than training in assisting integration.

SABMiller (Cases 5a and 5b) used to be a small local brewery in South Africa back in the 1980s and 1990s. At that time SAB split the country into five regions with a local managing director (MD) in each region. The local MD’s responsibilities were to run the brewery, to manage the distribution system, and control the sales force (marketing and finance was centrally managed in Johannesburg). When SABMiller started to acquire overseas breweries, it sent these MDs to run the acquired businesses (e.g. the acquired brewery in Hungary). The organisational capability which had been generated internally was exported with the transfer of managers to the businesses it took over.

However, it is not suitable for SABMiller to continue this approach because the company has become too big now (by acquiring many breweries around the world). Moreover, the transfer of skills, knowledge, methods and technologies around the group to enhance growth and efficiency becomes more frequent for SABMiller. SABMiller, therefore, codifies its best practices and transfers these in a variety of different ways. The codification is called ‘the SABMiller’s Way’ and it covers practices in marketing, brand building, and other functional areas. In each functional area it describes how a particular function performs its role and it seeks to achieve standardisation of best practices worldwide. SABMiller seemed to think that integration is not so much about training, development and long-term in thinking, but more about meeting aims quickly – their processes aim to drive behaviour to match issues identified in their integration plan. Therefore, SABMiller tends to introduce and use its codified best practice (SABMiller’s Ways) for integration in the short-term instead of longer term training.

3.1.9. Being informal

There are cases in which brand integration planning is more effective when done informally, usually when a company acquires a much smaller one and integrates the acquired brands into its portfolio. In this case, the acquisition is less strategically
important and top senior management involvement is not necessary, nor efficient. For
instance, when Diageo acquired Seagram (Case 1b) they did not have to evaluate the
entire brand portfolio again. Although the overall integration approach was formal, in
areas such as product and brand innovation, it was a very informal process. Innovation
people sat down with a few other functional teams, analysed the situation, and decided
on the aspects to be carried forward and the people Diageo needed to do that. Thus,
the whole process was faster and more effective than in the case of using a formal
process of implementation.

3.1.10. Being well-planned

Planning is crucial due to the fact that integration decisions involve several
and complex activities, communication processes across the whole network of a firm,
and, last but not least, risk management issues.

Planning enhanced the chance of success of the integration process in Cases
5a, 5b and 6. SAB (Cases 5a and 5b) used planning tools to validate whether they
could add any value to the acquired businesses of Miller and GEB. Similarly, CS
(Case 6) planned for the acquisition of Adams almost one year before Adams business
was actually put up for sale by Pfizer Inc. Planning also helped CS to implement
successfully the integration of Adams brands and operations and deliver synergy
benefits quickly (within two years of the deal being completed). For Diageo (Case 1b)
careful pre-planning was a key factor in the success of the integration of Seagram
brands, not least because it made it possible to reduce the risk associated with the
process even if this cost time.

3.1.11. Own-practice-based planning and evaluation

Developing a brand integration plan also involves an evaluation methodology
and all must be based on and driven by the firm’s own practice. Depending on the
industry and the motives for the deal, the development of a brand integration plan can
be marketing, manufacturing, or technology-led. For example, SABMiller developed a
marketing and brand-led integration plan, and a cash flow based evaluation
methodology (Cases 5a and 5b).

3.1.12. Controlling, explaining and being ‘brutal’

Human nature resists change (Lewin, 1951; Klein, 1996; Ford et al., 2002;
Trader-Leigh, 2002; Macri et al., 2002). According to the senior director at SAB
Miller, the two main reasons promoting resistance to change in Case 5b were that;
first, people had additional work in assisting and preparing for the sale of the business;
and secondly, they were uncertain as to whether they would keep their jobs
afterwards.

418
M&As usually stimulate change, to a greater or lesser degree. Lauser (2010) identifies several specific issues regarding the change processes involved in M&As. During the integration process, as formal and informal organizational structures are in place at the same time, the combined organisation may operate in disequilibrium. In order to avoid the perpetuity of such a position which is normally characterised by inefficiency, the organisation has to be pushed to the “edge of chaos” where the emergence of a new order is possible. In this stage communication, explanation and participation become more essential. Leaders have to stimulate and control the creation of new relationships and networks within the organisation, so that learning processes can take place.

A potential downside of any M&A is that it may add considerable operational complexity to the post-M&A organisation. Sometimes (mega) results in the post – M&A organisation become too complex and unmanageable. Overcomplicated or even contradictory organisational processes and approaches may pre-exist or develop in the merging firms, leading to unpredictable and occasionally destructive outcomes. The network of relationships in such a merged firm will also be huge and complex; and coupled with people's natural resistance to change will require extremely careful 'joined-up' management from both sides. It is often necessary to introduce a set of controls (operating rules, and procedures) to keep the process’s direction, and to implement them aggressively.

In Case 2 the manufacturing team of GSK proposed using similar packaging, pack types and sizes of drugs in order to reduce production complexity. These issues were considered as a part of each product and thus in the remit of the commercial team, who responded that they were happy with the existing product range and did not want to change. The real reason behind the commercial team's response was that the suggested changes would create more work and uncertainty for them. The manufacturing team then had to demonstrate the potential savings and how such changes could be initiated. In the integration planning process GSK encouraged people at the implementation level to provide feedback which was used to amend the original integration plan. In fact, as the business process was also revised from time to time based upon solid demonstration (cost, timeline and reasons for changes) from the implementation level, GSK developed its processes to control such changes when they were made.

Ford's problem was that as the result of its M&As people worked in very different ways in different locations (Cases 3a, 3b, 3c). As revealed by a manager at Ford Europe, Ford did not have a single universal approach for the way its people worked. Ford had many different systems and tools – the CAT system used to design cars in North America was different from the European system - different engineering tools and different financial tools gave rise to considerable complexity. Ford had to spend time to fix this problem and in 2005 they set up a group to look at PMTI (process, method, tool and implementation) to enable people to work together more effectively.
3.1.13. Dividing brand integration into measurable milestones

Due to the different activities involved between the start and finish of the integration, dividing the project into measurable milestones can make it easier to manage and also enhance the effectiveness of integration.

Diageo (Case 1b) managed the integration of Seagram brands by breaking the process into different functional work chunks (along the timeline). For example, Diageo divided the issues around brands into several chunks such as: identification of strategic positions for Seagram brands; planning for Seagram brands in Diageo’s portfolio; brand people training; and enhancing growth for Seagram brands. The first three chunks ran concurrently in the first six months after the deal was closed. The last chunk was dealt with later.

3.1.14. Rapid integration of information and reporting systems (IS&RS)

Rapid IS&RS integration can enhance the effectiveness of the integration process. IS was the first main process to be integrated in Case 1b (Diageo-Seagram), being connected with the brand RS and the governance of the new organisation. Prior to the acquisition, Diageo’s and Seagram’s reporting systems (sales report) were based on different IS platforms. One of the roles of the integration team immediately after the acquisition was implementing the integration of the IS in North America (where Seagram had its headquarters). On the human resources side, arranging for Seagram people (including brand people) to report to the right bosses, and arranging for the consistent setting of objectives and reviewing were also done immediately. As a result of these actions Seagram’s people were quickly made to feel that they belonged to the new business.

In Case 4 IS was also the first thing to be integrated after the SAC’s acquisition of Soten and its products.

3.1.15. Using professional services

In some cases (if the acquirer hasn’t already built up its capability and competence in integrating brands), external brand integration professional services might be needed. In order to acquire and integrate Seagram brands (Case 1b), Diageo employed an agency to gather sensitive data from Seagram before the deal. Right after the acquisition announcement, Diageo managed to secure the acquired business, due to the fact that, at its agency’s suggestion, Diageo had asked Seagram to format their clean-room process data in a way optimal to Diageo’s needs.

3.2. Divesting merging brands

After a M&A some brand divestments may be required. For any one of a variety of reasons the firm may need to sell one or more of its brands. When selling, the firm obviously wants to maximise a brand’s value.
3.2.1. External services versus internal expertise

It is important to decide whether to use external services or the firm’s internal expertise in the brand disposal process. A third party professional service (e.g. an investment bank) may maximise the value of the disposed brand because it generates a situation that maximises the competitive tension between the parties interested in acquiring the brand. It can also prepare projections, brand performance history, future strategy and others, in the formal bidding process. In Case 1a the post-merger Diageo sold the ‘Dewar’s’ Scotch whisky and ‘Bombay’ gin brands (as an condition for the merger) through a merchant bank. Similarly, GEB used an investment bank to sell its business and brands to SABMiller (Case 5b). The estimated value of GEB business and brands was around US$7 billion but SABMiller eventually paid US$ 7.8 billion for the purchase of the GEB business and its brands.

If the seller organisation has already developed its own expertise, the use of external services is redundant. In Case 1b the US’ Federal Trade Commission ordered Diageo to dispose of the ‘Malibu’ brand (of Seagram) to another firm because of the antitrust concern in the coconut-flavoured rum segment. Diageo reduced its costs in selling ‘Malibu’ by using its in-house team instead of employing a merchant bank. By the time of the Seagram acquisition Diageo had already built its skills and capabilities in selling brands from the previous merger (between Guinness and Grand Met). Apart from the ‘Malibu’ brand, Diageo also sold more than 50 Seagram brands which neither Diageo nor Pernod Ricard (Diageo’s joint acquisition partner) wanted.

3.2.2. Making the sale more competitive

Competitive interest in the purchase of a brand correlates to its value and relies on there being willing buyers and a willing seller. There is always negotiation around price, influenced by the degree of interest in the brand being sold (number of bidders, willingness to pay etc.), and the state of the financial market. These two factors create a competitive dynamic that usually determines a paid price different from the real value of the brand.

In the sale of its business and brands GEB (through an appointed investment bank) invited all the big players in the beer industry to participate in the bid (Case 5b). By doing this GEB created a degree of competitive tension among all the parties who were interested in acquiring GEB business and brands. Diageo did the same when it put the ‘Malibu’ brand on sale in the post-Seagram acquisition.

When Ford was negotiating to acquire Jaguar (Case 3a), Jaguar was also in talks with General Motors. Ford had failed to develop a premium car brand internally, which increased their desire to acquire a premium brand such as Jaguar. According to a manager at Ford Europe, the chairman of Jaguar at that time did a great job in presenting his company as good to buy and with a great racing heritage. While Ford and Jaguar were negotiating, GM were discussing taking around a 30% stake in Jaguar and shortly announced plans to form a GM/Jaguar joint venture. GM’s interest in Jaguar increased Ford’s interest in buying the Jaguar brand, as a result of which Ford
Management & Marketing

put in a new offer to take over Jaguar 100% by paying a premium price. Ford expressed their intention to increase investment and to retain Jaguar manufacturing in England, and not to cross-franchise Jaguar and Ford dealers; from all of which Jaguar would benefit enormously. Ford agreed to pay US$2.5 billion for Jaguar in total. As analysed in an article by Reuter published in The New York Times (1990), ‘the price of the Ford Motor Company’s $2.5 billion acquisition of Jaguar P.L.C. was five times the British auto maker’s actual net asset value’. The auto analysts criticised Ford for paying such a significant ($2 billion) premium for Jaguar.

3.2.3. Comparative technique

In order to increase the perceived value of the divested brand, comparing offers and playing bidders off against one another can be useful.

In Case 5b, throughout the bidding process GEB continually benchmarked the offers of Heineken and SABMiller against each other. Even upon picking SABMiller as the winner, GEB still compared SABMiller’s offer with the one from Heineken on all other terms and conditions.

3.2.4. Prior bidder analysis and evaluation

The seller can pre-assess potential bidders to gain insight into their organisation and to estimate how much they can afford to pay for the brand. Such assessment should enable the seller to select the most desirable bidders and to increase their own effectiveness in the negotiation process. This technique is complementary to the comparative technique and is especially useful when a powerful brand (in terms of market share, future growth and profitability) is being sold to a big competitor. The risk that the seller needs to analyse and evaluate regards the potential competitive threat of the divested brand after being leveraged by the buyer-competitor's expertise and competence.

In Case 1a Diageo decided to sell both ‘Dewar’s’ and ‘Bombay Sapphire’ brands to Bacardi to satisfy the Federal Trade Commission’s anti-trust requirement. This decision was facilitated by a pre-deal assessment of potential bidders for the two brands. Not surprisingly Diageo did not simply choose the buyer who was prepared to pay the most; they preferred to sell to a small competitor who was willing to pay a high price rather than to a bigger one who might provide future direct competition. As Bacardi did not have a presence in the Scotch whisky and gin markets they bought the two brands and paid an amount that represented their expectation of the brands’ growth opportunities. Similarly, in Case 2 GSK decided to divest ‘Kytril’ (a 5HT-3 Antiemetic drug for cancer treatment) to F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd, ‘Famvir’ (Second Generation Oral & Intravenous Antiviral Drugs for the Treatment of Herpes) and ‘Denavir’ (Prescription Topical Antiviral Cremes for Oral Herpes) drugs to Novartis based upon a pre-analysis of these buyers, in order to meet both the FTC’s order and GSK’s own requirements.
3.2.5. Fixed timeline

In the brand disposal process the seller encounters the risk of disclosing confidential and sensitive information about the brand. Both buyer and seller try to minimise their risks during the ‘due diligence’ stage in which the seller agrees for the buyer to access privileged information about the brand. Setting a fixed schedule or timeline for the sale of the brand in general and for the due diligence on the disposed brand in particular helps the seller to decrease the effect of information disclosure to outsiders.

In Case 5b GEB allowed the selected bidders a two-month time slot for due diligence, allowing them: to work with data in an agreed format; to attend management presentations; and a site visit. All the bidders had the same information. When GEB picked Heineken and SABMiller for the final round of bidding they gave the two firms two weeks to reach a final agreement. This working schedule helped GEB to reduce the cost, time, and human resources invested in the process.

4. Conclusions

Awareness of good practices can enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the brand integration following M&As. Acquiring knowledge from other organisations and cases is a valuable method to collect winning practices that may improve or facilitate future M&As.

As M&As are a learning process (Very and Schweiger, 2001), the past practices can be stored and adopted for later deals. This research identifies and defines twenty practices – which have been proven good skills, tactics, methods, and techniques – behind the integration of brands in various M&A deals taken by MNCs.

Because issues of organisation, M&As or brand are multi-faceted and varied, good practices for dealing with those issues are quite diversified. Without a systematic classification it will be difficult for managers to effectively recall for adoption, as well as to pile on other practices that have not been revealed by this research. Therefore, dividing these twenty practices in some major groups, in a systematic way, will help. In fact these twenty practices are related to different aspects (or dimensions) of brand and brand management during and after M&As: brand strategic positioning, brand people, brand knowledge transfer, brand integration planning, brand integration implementation, brand disposal expertise, brand disposal negotiation, and brand due diligence (Table 4).

Thus, this research takes a step forward by classifying these practices into eight major clusters according to the dimensions of brand and brand management they are related to, so that M&A and integration managers can accumulate their own brand integration practices from time to time systematically and, thereafter, facilitate the adoption of learning approach to their later M&As.
### Grouping Brand Integration Practices in M&As

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<td>Balancing consistency and flexibility</td>
<td>People</td>
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<td>Organising human resources</td>
<td>Knowledge transfer</td>
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<td>Being equal, treating people with respect, fair financial benefits</td>
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<td>Providing training to brand people</td>
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<td>Fixed timeline</td>
<td>Brand due diligence</td>
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**Source:** Authors’ own research.

### 5. Research limitations and future research directions

Although twenty practices for integrating brands after M&As captured in this paper are among the prominent ones identified from several world’s most admired MNCs, they are certainly not all. In addition these practices are quite scattered if they stand alone.

Given the short timescale of this study and information limitations imposed by the case study firms the researcher is aware of few limitations. First, the majority of the Case Studies in this research involve companies that manufacture physical products. Consequently, a natural consequence of the previous point is that caution needs to be exercised when generalising the findings of this research to new market sectors and entities such as people and place brands/branding. Secondly, given that the time available to conduct fieldwork for this research was limited and that in some cases the researcher’s access to key individuals was constrained (for a number of different reasons), this necessarily places its own limits on the generalizability of the findings. For example, while this research has described in detail the various good practices that take place in horizontal M&As, there might produce additional outcomes (i.e. good practices) with further studies.

From the limitations mentioned above, there is a potential area for future study. Service industries present special problems because their ‘products’ are largely intangible. M&A integration practices in the service industry probably involves far more than this research was able to learn. Further study of M&A integration practices...
and others (such as strategies, process, tasks etc.) in the service industry sector could benefit both academia and industry.

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